

ЭГИНЕ БАРСЕГЯН, АЙК КОЧАРЯН

Адаптация ислама: эволюция идеалов «Братьев-мусульман»¹ в европейском контексте (на английском языке)

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Adapting Islam: The Evolution of Muslim Brotherhood Ideals in European Context

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This paper aims to explore the mechanisms employed by the Muslim Brotherhood, within the framework of Islamic jurisprudence, to rationalize the presence of Muslims in Europe and to provide answers to the problems and issues they face. To achieve this, the article will concentrate on the perspectives of two prominent Islamic jurists from the Muslim Brotherhood milieu, Yusuf al-Qaradawi and Taha Jabir al-Alwani. They played crucial roles in addressing emerging questions surrounding the presence of Muslims in European societies, starting from the permissibility for Muslims to live in Europe to everyday issues and concerns. By examining the Muslim Brotherhood's stance in the matter of Muslim presence and integration in Europe, the article seeks to provide a deeper understanding of the dynamic interplay between the Muslim Brotherhood and the socio-political landscape of Europe.

Keywords: Muslim Brotherhood, ikhwan, Islam, Europe, Muslim integration, fiqh al-aqalliyāt.

1. Организация запрещена на территории РФ.

Introduction

Muslim Brotherhood² (Arabic: al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn) is a transnational Islamist organization founded in 1928 in Egypt by Hasan al-Banna³. Al-Banna was deeply concerned about the moral and spiritual decline of Egyptian society and sought to revitalize Islam in the daily lives of Muslims. Al-Banna's teaching emphasized the importance of Islamic education, social welfare, and political activism within the framework of Islamic principles. He advocated for the establishment of an Islamic state based on the principles of *Sharia* – the Islamic law, emphasizing the importance of social justice, economic equality, and unity of the Muslim *ummah* (community). Initially focused on promoting Islamic principles and fostering social and political change in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood has since expanded its influence throughout the Middle East and beyond, establishing branches and affiliated organizations worldwide, including in Europe. The Muslim Brotherhood stands out among other Islamist organizations with its excellent adaptability skills which have been instrumental in its widespread success. Today, the Muslim Brotherhood stands as one of the most influential Islamist movements globally, with a network that spans across all continents and with ample resources at its disposal.

The first Muslim Brotherhood groups appeared in Europe in the second half of the 20th century, primarily driven by the persecution of their members in Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries⁴. Initially, *Ikhwans* saw Europe as a temporary refuge. They even likened their situa-

2. We use the term *Muslim Brotherhood* to refer to the organization and *Ikhwan* to refer to individuals within the Brotherhood network.
3. Hasan al-Banna was born in 1906 in a religiously devout family in Mahmudiyya, a town in the Nile Delta region of Egypt. His father, Ahmed Abd al-Rahman al-Banna, was a Hanbali imam and played a significant role in his son's religious upbringing. Al-Banna was also deeply influenced by the teachings of several prominent Islamic scholars and reformers, including Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida, who advocated for a revival of Islamic principles in response to the challenges posed by Western colonialism and modernity.
4. The persecution of Muslim Brotherhood members in Egypt has a long history, starting in the era of monarchy and continuing during the presidency of Gamal Abdel Nasser (1956–1970), as well as during the presidencies of Anwar Sadat (1970–1980) and Hosni Mubarak (1981–2011). A wave of repressions against the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria began in the 1980s, triggered by the 1982 Homs uprising, as a result of which the Muslim Brotherhood was banned in Syria. In the 1980s and 1990s, similar repressions against the Brotherhood members unfolded in Libya and Tunisia. A wave of migration from Iraq to Europe happened mainly in 1990–1991, following the first Gulf crisis when Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. More on the reasons for the Brotherhood members' migration to Europe, see Frampton, M. (2018) *The Muslim Brotherhood and the West*.

tion to Prophet Muhammad's migration from Mecca to Medina in 622 continuing to focus on events in their home countries⁵. However, in a short time, *Ikhwans* changed their perspective, shifting their focus to Muslims living in Europe. In Europe, *Ikhwans* found the freedom to pursue their activities, for which they often faced repression in their home countries. While remaining supportive of establishing Islamic states in the *Muslim world*, *Ikhwans* shifted their focus towards Muslims living in the West whom they viewed as fertile ground for their activities, seeking to spread their interpretation of Islam among them. In their research⁶, Vidino L. and Altuna S. argue that, in Europe, the aim of the *Ikhwans* is establish themselves as the representatives of Muslim communities to European governments. This strategic objective will expand their influence and allow them to participate in state decision-making processes concerning Muslim communities. Moreover, achieving this goal would also make *Ikhwans* highly dominant among other Islamist movements and organizations operating in Europe. Compared to other groups, the Muslim Brotherhood possesses ample financial resources and excellent adaptability skills, giving them a significant advantage in shaping the narrative and direction of Islam in Europe.

The settlement of the first Muslim Brotherhood groups in Europe coincided with a significant influx of Muslim migration to the continent. The migration of Muslims to Europe during the 1950s and 1960s was prompted by an economic crisis and high unemployment rates in their home countries on one hand and the high demand for inexpensive labor in European countries on the other. Due to these circumstances, the majority of Muslim immigrants comprised of young males, many of whom were married with families left behind in their home countries. Most of them had limited language proficiency and low level of education. As a result, most immigrants found employment in the lower sectors of the economy⁷. Initially, like *Ikhwans*, they also did not

A History of Enmity and Engagement. Harvard University Press; Maréchal, B. (2008) *The Muslim Brothers in Europe. Roots and Discourse*. Leiden/Boston.

5. Vidino, L. (2006) "Aims and Methods of Europe's Muslim Brotherhood", *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*. Hudson Institute [<https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/aims-and-methods-of-europe-s-muslim-brotherhood>, accessed on 03.03.2024].
6. Vidino, L., Altuna, S. (2021) *The Muslim Brotherhood's Pan-European Structure*. Austrian Fund for the Documentation of Religiously Motivated Political Extremism (Documentation Centre Political Islam, pp. 34–44.
7. On the causes, process, and consequences of Muslim migration to Europe in the second half of the 20th century, see Nielsen, J. (2016) *Muslims in Western Europe*. Edinburgh University Press.

see Europe as a place of permanent residency. They waited for the political and economic situation in their countries to be settled, enabling them to return and reunite with their families. However, over time, they came to realize that the socio-economic conditions in their home countries were unlikely to improve soon, leading many of them to reconsider the perspective of permanent residency in Europe and bring their families there as well. As a result, only a fraction of the Muslim immigrants who initially came to Europe for employment eventually returned to their home countries⁸. This shift in perspective marked a significant turning point in the demographic composition of Muslim communities in Europe, as family reunification became increasingly common, and the concept of permanent settlement took root.

The settlement of Muslims in Europe brought forth many questions and challenges that demanded immediate attention and solutions. Initially, these concerns were not as pronounced, given that the first generation of Muslims viewed Europe as a temporary refuge. However, the situation changed dramatically when a significant number of Muslims chose not to return to their countries but instead opted for permanent residency in Europe. Until then, as Nielsen J. notes, Muslims had separated the secular aspect of their lives, related to European societies and work, from the religious aspect, largely confined to home⁹. Maintaining this segregation became impractical with the reunification of families, as a result of which Islam became a significant factor in family and work life of Muslims¹⁰. This shift raised a number of questions, ranging from the permissibility for Muslims to live in non-Islamic societies to more mundane issues, such as whether a Muslim can purchase meat slaughtered in a non-halal manner, attend events where alcohol or pork are served, work as a salesman in a shop selling alcohol, congratulate non-Muslims on non-Islamic holidays, or issues concerning aspects of marriage and divorce, among other matters.

Muslim migration to Europe created a huge gap in Islamic jurisprudence that needed to be addressed urgently. The *Ikhwans* were the first to recognize the imperative need for adjustments under these

8. In 1950, the total number of Muslims in Europe was 10,765,329 people, constituting 1.97%. By 2020, this figure had increased to 42,706,747 people, representing 5.76%. See Kettani, H. (2010) "Muslim Population in Europe. 1950–2020", *International Journal of Environmental Science and Development* 1(2).

9. Nielsen, J. *Muslims in Western Europe*, p. 117.

10. The process of family reunification was accompanied by a sharp increase in the number of mosques in Europe. See Nielsen, J. *Muslims in Western Europe*, p. 117.

new circumstances¹¹. To bridge this gap, prominent Islamic jurists and theoreticians from the Muslim Brotherhood milieu embarked on the task of revising and reformulating various religious theories related to the permissibility of Muslims living in non-Islamic societies, questions regarding the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims, and other crucial issues. These unfolding transformations highlighted how Muslim Brotherhood ideologues, influenced by the circumstances they faced, took different stances on certain matters compared to the “classic” ideologues of the movement, such as Al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb. However, it is not easy to openly deviate from the “classics.” According to Wickham K., openly criticizing Hasan al-Banna or deviating from his ideas is frowned upon by many members of the Brotherhood¹². In cases where the ideas of the “classics” come into conflict with current needs, new interpretations are offered that do not wholly deny their legacy but pave the way for change. For example, Hasan al-Banna’s opposition to *ḥizbiyyah*, multi-party system, is one such matter. To resolve this issue and allow the participation of Muslims in the political lives of European societies, it was suggested that Hasan al-Banna was not fundamentally against the multi-party system but that his position was influenced by the specific circumstances in Egypt during his lifetime¹³. The same approach is observed with Sayyid Qutb, although to a lesser extent. Calvert J. notes that Sayyid Qutb’s status as a *shahīd* (martyr) prevents *Ikhwans* from taking a completely negative stance towards Qutb’s legacy¹⁴. Hence, delicate considerations are necessary when dealing with these and other related issues.

While the movement’s “classic” ideologues continue to exert influence, new ideologues emerged. Among them, Egyptian Islamic jurist Yusuf al-Qaradawi and the Iraqi Islamic jurist Taha Jabir al-Alwani hold particular significance.

Yusuf al-Qaradawi (1926–2022) was one of the most influential Muslim scholars and jurists of the modern times. Al-Qaradawi joined

11. The secular approaches to addressing the coexistence of Muslims and non-Muslims in Europe, as developed by Bassam Tibi, Jocelyne Cesari, Jørgen S. Nielsen, Olivier Roy, and others within the framework of European Islam or Euro-Islam, are not discussed in this article.

12. Wickham, C. R. (2013) “What Would Hasan Al-Banna Do?: Modern (Re-)Interpretations of the Brotherhood’s Founding Discourse”, in E. Bakker, R. Meijer (eds) *The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe*, pp. 240–248. Hurst/Columbia University Press.

13. Ibid.

14. Calvert, J. (2013) “Wayward Son: The Muslim Brothers’ Reception of Sayyid Qutb; in E. Bakker, R. Meijer (eds) *The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe*, pp. 249–271. Hurst/Columbia University Press.

the Muslim Brotherhood in his youth, and his affiliation with the organization led to his imprisonment several times in Egypt, including three occasions during the presidency of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Eventually, Al-Qaradawi left Egypt to Qatar in 1961, where he continued his scholarly activities and soon became a prominent figure in the Islamic world. Al-Qaradawi did not return to Egypt until 2011, following the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak (1981–2011), when the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Mohamed Morsi became president.

Throughout his life, Al-Qaradawi wrote extensively on various aspects of Islam. Beyond this, he gained widespread recognition for his television program *al-Sharī'ah wa al-Ḥayāt* (Shariah and Life) aired on Al-Jazeera, where he addressed various issues related to Islam. He held leadership positions in several organizations associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Most importantly, he played an instrumental role in the establishment of the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR), where he served in a long-term director position. Although later in life he denied his membership in the Muslim Brotherhood, he is regarded as one of the movement's leading theoreticians, and his books and *fatwas* — legal rulings — are regularly used and quoted by the members of Muslim Brotherhood.

As for Taha Jabir al-Alwani (1935–2016), he was one of the main representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States. Al-Alwani's association with the Muslim Brotherhood began during his youth, when he became a member of the Iraqi branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Upon relocating to the United States in 1983, Al-Alwani continued his advocacy for Islamic principles and ideology of Muslim Brotherhood. In the US, he founded and led the Fiqh Council of North America. He also served as the head of Cordoba University, located in the state of Virginia.

Both Al-Qaradawi and Al-Alwani have played pivotal roles in shaping and developing several legal doctrines within Islamic jurisprudence, significantly contributing to addressing the issues regarding the settlement of Muslims in Europe. These doctrines will be discussed in detail below.

Muslim Brotherhood at the Intersection of Various Poles of Islamic Thought. The Concept of *Wasatīyyah* (Moderation)

Hasan al-Banna saw Islam as a self-sufficient system and a comprehensive way of life, applicable to all times and places. This perspective found expression in the doctrine of *shumuliyyat al-islām* — com-

prehensiveness of Islam. Hasan al-Banna believed that Islam should be at the root of everything, and Muslims should not separate it from other aspects of their lives but rather actively work towards its integrating into their daily lives. According to this doctrine, Islam is not just a religion but an independent and self-sufficient system and way of life that governs all aspects of human existence, including personal, social, economic, and political spheres.

The doctrine of *shumuliyyat al-islām* presents Islam as a way of life that is relevant for all times and places. This found its expression in the doctrine of *ʿālamīyya* – global nature of Islam. *Ikhwans*, perceiving their primary objective the preservation of Islamic identity in the West¹⁵, argue that it is necessary to demonstrate flexibility and adapt to the requirements and conditions of the European reality. As a result, Islamic jurists within the Muslim Brotherhood milieu developed several crucial doctrines, aiming to coordinate all aspects of life for Muslim communities in Europe. The core of these doctrines lies in preserving Islamic identity and preventing the assimilation of Muslims into European societies. Simultaneously, they promote the integration of Muslims into these societies, aiming to prevent their isolation and as a result the formation of Muslim ghettos. This idea was best expressed by Yusuf al-Qaradawi in his famous quote: “Commitment without isolation, integration without assimilation”¹⁶.

Central to these doctrines is *wasatīyyah*, the concept of “moderation” or the “middle way.” One of its leading theoreticians was Yusuf al-Qaradawi, in whose works the study and exploration of this doctrine occupied a central place¹⁷. *Wasatīyyah* is derived from the Arabic word *wasat*, which can be translated as “middle,” “just,” or “moderate.” The term *wasat* is taken from the Quran. It is mentioned, for example, in verse 68:28: *qāl awsaṭuhum* (the most righteous of them

15. During the 2000s, the Council of European Muslims (CEM), the main structure of the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe, published a document titled the “Charter of the Muslims of Europe”. Addressed to all Muslims in Europe, this document calls upon them to integrate into the European societies and actively participate in their social and political life. In fact, this was CEM’s first attempt to outline its understanding of Islam and its position on these important issues. See *Muslims of Europe Charter*, Council of European Muslims, [https://www.eumuslims.org/en/islam-europe, accessed on 22.03.2023].

16. Al-Qaraḍāwī, Yu. (2000) *Awlawiyyāt al-Ḥaraka al-Islāmiyya*, p. 171. Lubnān: Dār al-Risāla.

17. Al-Qaradawi’s main ideas on this issue are presented in the following work: Al-Qaraḍāwī, Yu. (2009) *Fiqh al-Wasatiyyah al-Islamiyya wa al-Tajdid*. Markaz al-Qaraḍāwī li al-Wasatiyyah al-Islamiyya wa al-Tajdid.

said), as well as in verse 2:143, where it is explicitly stated that Allah made Muslims an *ummatan wasaṭan*, an intermediate umma so that they serve as “witnesses” (*shuhadā*) for all mankind, with Prophet Muhammad as their witness¹⁸.

Wasaṭiyyah is the doctrine of moderation, representing “a middle way between secularism and radicalism”¹⁹, a principle that Al-Qaradawi considers one of the fundamental features of Islam. For Muslims living in a non-Islamic environment, *wasatiyyah* serves as means of harmonization various aspects of life” — such as religion, work, and family” — within that context. It encourages the active participation of Muslims in the political and public spheres of their host countries, promoting tolerance for other religions and cultures. It urges Muslims to refrain from religious extremism and fanaticism while remaining vigilant and steadfast in upholding Islamic values.

Wasaṭiyyah is in complete alignment with the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, which holds a middle ground among various currents of Islamic thought, incorporating and drawing from different aspects of these divergent perspectives. Hasan al-Banna placed his organization at the center of diverse poles of Islamic thought. The Muslim Brotherhood ideology stands at the intersection of various poles of Islamic thought, incorporating and drawing from different aspects of these divergent perspectives. A notable illustration of this is the Muslim Brotherhood’s non-allegiance to any *madhhab* — school of thought within Islamic jurisprudence — considering it necessary not to be confined to a single *madhhab* when issuing *fatwas*²⁰.

Furthermore, with Sufism²¹, the Muslim Brotherhood shares the appreciation of the spiritual aspect of Islam but differs from it by not accepting the practice of Sufi mystics who completely isolate

18. More on this issue see Kocharyan, H. M. (2005) *Ummayī kargavichakn u bnoroshumē Ghuranum ev vagh islmakan skzbnaghbyurnerum* (The Status and Definition of the Ummah in the Quran and Early Islamic Sources), Dissertation. Yerevan.

19. Vidino, L., *Aims and Methods of Europe’s Muslim Brotherhood*.

20. Hasan al-Banna emphasized the importance of not favoring one *madhhab* when making legal decisions. Al-Qaradawi also writes in this regard that although one should avoid rigid adherence to a specific *madhhab*, legal rulings should not contradict the principles of all four *madhhabs*. Al-Qaraḍāwī, Yu. (2001) *Fī Fiqh al-Aqallīyyāt al-Muslimīna*, pp. 57–60. Al-Qāhira: Dār al-Shurūq.

21. Sufism (Arabic: al-Sūfiyya or al-Taṣawwuf) is a mystical and spiritual direction that emerged in Islam in the second half of the 8th century. Its goal is to deepen one’s inner connection with Allah and seek intimacy with Him. Followers of Sufism, known as *Sufis*, strive for spiritual purity, inner peace, and perfection through various spiritual exercises. See Chittick, W. C. (2000) “*Taṣawwuf*”, *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. 10, pp. 313–324. Leiden: Brill.

themselves from society, devoting solely to the worship of Allah. Instead, the Brotherhood emphasizes participation and involvement in public and political life. The fact that Hasan al-Banna was interested in Sufism during his youth and was a member of the *Hasafiyyah tariqa* — order — plays an important role in this context. The *Hasafiyyah* order emerged from the *Shaziliyyah* order, which was community-centered and did not advocate the seclusion practiced by some other Sufis. Instead of isolating itself from society, the *Hasafiyyah* aimed to strengthen Islam in people's lives and social relations²².

In regard to their approach to social and political engagement, the Muslim Brotherhood also diverges from Salafis²³, who aim to prevent the assimilation of Muslims into European societies by discouraging their participation in political and social life. Al-Qaradawi not only considers it permissible for Muslims to live in Western countries and actively engage in their social and political lives but also notes that “in this century, it is necessary for Islam to establish its presence in those societies that have an influence on world politics”²⁴.

Al-Alwani also emphasizes that the presence of Muslims in any country should be permanent, not temporary. He brings the example of Muslims who migrated to *Habashah* (Ethiopia) during the time of Prophet Muhammad. He says that while the migration of Muslims was due to the life-threatening conditions for them in Mecca, the Muslims who migrated to Ethiopia did not return after Prophet Muhammad's conquest of Mecca in 630. Instead, they remained in Ethiopia, actively propagating and spreading the teachings of Islam there. Similarly, Al-Alwani contends that Muslims settled in Europe should not only continue residing there but should also actively engage in the political and social life of those countries, adhering to the *‘ālamīyya* global nature of Islam. Moreover, Al-Alwani considers it not just the right (*ḥaqq*) but also the duty (*wājib*) of Muslims²⁵.

Furthermore, the Muslim Brotherhood aligns with Salafis in acknowledging that the primary sources of Islamic law — the Quran and

22. Mitchell, R. P. (1969) *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, pp. 1–6. New York: Oxford University Press.

23. Salafism is an Islamic school of thought whose adherents, known as Salafis, advocate for strict adherence to the example set by the Prophet Muhammad and the “pious ancestors” (al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ), the first three generations of Islam.

24. Al-Qaradāwī, *Awlawiyyāt al-Ḥaraka al-Islāmiyya*, 170.

25. Al-‘Alwānī, T. J. (1999) *Madḫal ila Fiqh al-Aqallīyyāt (Naẓarāt Ta’asīsiyya)*, pp. 18–19, [<https://citj.org/index.php/citj/article/view/1775>, accessed on 03.03.2023].

Sunnah — should be the unequivocal authority for legal rulings. However, they also emphasize the importance of secondary sources of Islamic law. While Salafis exclusively accept the methods employed by the *salaf*, the first and best three generations of Muslims, the Muslim Brotherhood believes that every era in human history has its unique characteristics and needs, making the use of new methods and the adoption of new legal rulings inevitable. They explain it by the global nature of Islam (*‘ālamīyya*), emphasizing that it is intended for all humanity and all times. As such, it cannot be confined to a specific period, thereby denying it the opportunity to be an important factor in modern societies.

Al-Alwani observes that Muslims of the past did not face the same conditions that contemporary Muslims do. The modern era is marked by the interaction and coexistence of different cultures, whereas Muslims of the past lived in a divided and isolated world, where *fiqh al-ḥarb*, the “jurisprudence of war,” dominated. However, in today’s diverse world, Muslims need *fiqh al-ta’āyush*, “jurisprudence of Co-existence.” He notes that the works of Muslim authors and jurists of the medieval period, including Ibn Taymiyya, were responses to the specific circumstances of their time and cannot be uniformly applied to the modern world. Al-Alwani adds that the alternative to *fiqh al-ta’ayush* is *taqāfat al-ṣirā’*, “the culture of fight,” which Muslim communities do not need²⁶.

As for the Muslim Brotherhood’s stance on *jihad*²⁷, despite not opposing its discretionary value, they diverge from Islamic radicals, who regard *jihad* as *farḍ ‘ayn* — an individual duty for every Muslim. The Muslim Brotherhood, in contrast, views *jihad* as *farḍ kifāyah* — a collective duty. The concept of *jihad* as *farḍ kifāyah* requires the presence of a legitimate Islamic authority, such as a caliph or a rightful leader, to declare and lead the *jihad*. This ensures that the *jihad* is conducted under proper guidance and with legitimate authority, distinguishing it from the more radical view of individual duty. However, in specific situations, like that of Palestine, *ikhwans* consider individual *jihad* permissible, which diminishes the image of moderate Islamists

26. Al-‘Alwānī, *Madḥal ila Fiqh al-Aqallīyyāt*, pp. 6–7.

27. *Jihād*, derived from the Arabic word *jahada*, translates to “striving” in English. In the religious-ideological context of the Quran, it signifies the act of striving in the path to Allah. There are two primary types of *jihad*: the “great *jihad*,” involving the inner struggle of individuals to free themselves from the influence of the devil, and the “small *jihad*,” which refers to holy war against non-believers and infidels.

they have nurtured in the eyes of European governments²⁸. Al-Qaradawi's stance on Jihad is elucidated in his extensive work "*Fiqh al-Jihad*"²⁹ (The Jurisprudence of Jihad), spanning over 1600 pages. He sees *jihad* as a defensive mechanism, aimed at safeguarding Muslims in the face of aggression or oppression. Hence, *jihad* in the case of Palestinians is justified as they have the right to pursue *jihad* in self-defense against Israel³⁰.

In conclusion, the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology, marked by the concept of *wasatiyyah*, positions it at a unique intersection of various poles of Islamic thought. By embracing the doctrine of *shumuliyyat al-islām* and advocating for active participation in public life, the Brotherhood seeks to integrate Islamic principles into all aspects of life while promoting social and political engagement.

Europe as *Dār al-Da'wah*—Abode of Propaganda

Central to the doctrine of *wasatiyyah* is the concept of *dār al-da'wah*³¹, house or abode of propaganda. In traditional Islamic jurisprudence, the world is divided into two parts: *dār al-islām*, abode of Islam, and *dār al-ḥarb*, abode of war. *Dār al-islām* encompasses areas where Islamic law is applied and where Muslims constitute a majority. It is a secure and peaceful area where Muslims are free to practice their religion and adhere to *Sharia*⁴. Historically, *dār al-islām* included areas that were under Muslim rule, such as the Arabian Peninsula, North Africa, Spain, and parts of Asia. Conversely, *dār al-ḥarb* denotes non-

28. Rich, D., Rubin, B. (ed.) (2010) *The Very Model of a British Muslim Brotherhood, The Muslim Brotherhood: The Organization and Policies of a Global Islamist Movement*, pp. 117–136. New York.

29. Al-Qaradāwī, Yu. (2009) *Fiqh al-Jihād*. al-Qāhira: Dār al-Wahba.

30. See, for example, *New Muslim Brotherhood Leader: Resistance in Iraq and Palestine is Legitimate; America is Satan, Islam Will Invade America and Europe*. MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 655 (February 4, 2004) [<https://www.memri.org/reports/new-muslim-brotherhood-leader-resistance-iraq-and-palestine-legitimate-america-satan-islam>, accessed on 03.03.2024].

31. The Arabic term *da'wah* translates as "invitation" or "call." In the Quran, it refers to the call made by Allah and the prophets to people to embrace the religion of God. Quranic verses such as 12:108, 16:125, and 41:33, emphasize the importance of conveying the message of Islam to people. The duty of Prophet Muhammad was to deliver the invitation of Islam (*da'wah al-Islām*) to humanity. Over time, particularly influenced by Ismailism, a branch of Shia Islam, the concept of *dawah* expanded to include the propaganda efforts carried out by Muslims aimed at spreading Islamic teachings and values among non-Muslims, with the goal of their conversion to Islam. See Canard, M. (1991) "Da'wa", *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol. 2, pp. 168–170. Leiden; Poston, L. (1992) *Islamic Da'wah in the West*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Islamic territories where *Sharia* is not applied, and Muslims are a minority. From the perspective of traditional Islamic jurisprudence, these areas are perceived as hotbeds of instability, where Muslims may find themselves in conflict situations with non-Muslims and where openly professing and propagating Islam is illegal.

Historically, *dār al-ḥarb* also included Europe, except for Spain, which remained part of the Islamic world until the late 15th century. However, in the 20th century, it became obvious that the situation had changed dramatically. Although Muslims do not constitute a majority in Europe, and Islamic law is not applied there, Muslims enjoy equal rights and are not persecuted for practicing their religion. Moreover, leveraging the freedoms offered by European societies, Muslims can freely engage in the propagation of Islam without hindrance. Therefore, Europe can no longer be considered *dār al-ḥarb*. To address this issue, the Union of Islamic Organizations in France (UIOF)³² organized a seminar in 1991, where renowned Islamic jurists, among them many associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, such Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Faisal al-Mawlawi, and Abdullah Jaballah, collectively concluded that the traditional division between *dār al-Islām* and *dār al-ḥarb* no longer accurately reflects the reality. They introduced the third category, defining Europe neither as *dār al-ḥarb* nor *dār al-Islām* but as *dār al-da'wah*³³, the abode of propaganda — a territory where the spreading of Islam should exclusively occur through peaceful means³⁴. In 1995, at an Islamic conference held in Toledo, Al-Qaradawi declared: “We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America, not with sword, but with Da'wah.” This sentiment was reiterated in a

32. The Union of Islamic Organizations in France (UIOF), later renamed as Muslims of France (MF), is the main organization of the Muslim Brotherhood in France. It is an umbrella organization and coordinates the activities of other organizations belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood network in France. See Vidino, L., Altuna, S. *The Muslim Brotherhood's Pan-European Structure*, p. 55.

33. It is worth noting that alongside *dār al-da'wah*, various other terms are also employed, albeit with less frequency. These include *dār al-'ahd* (territory of the treaty) and *dār al-shahāda* (territory of shahadah), among others. Top of Form

34. In contrast, Hasan al-Banna's ideas in this regard were more aggressive in terminology. In the movement's goals, he stated the envisioned outcome after purging Western values from Muslim societies and reinstating Islamic values. He stated, “We will not stop here. We will send this evil back to its cradle, conquer its home and fight until the world rejoices in the name of the Prophet and the teachings of Islam spread throughout the world. Only then will the Muslims achieve their main goal.” This evolution underscores the adaptability of the Muslim Brotherhood's strategies in response to the socio-political landscape of the 20th century. *Majmū'at al-Rasā'il*, p. 153. al-Maktaba al-Tawfiqiyya, 1984.

fatwa published in IslamOnline in 2002, where he stated, “Islam will return to Europe as conqueror and victorious after being twice exiled from it. This time the conquest will not be by sword, but by Da’wah and ideology”³⁵.

Furthermore, Al-Qaradawi states that the use of force can only intimidate potential Muslims, asserting that the reformation (iṣlāḥ) and renewal (tajdīd) of European societies can only be achieved through peaceful preaching³⁶. Al-Alwani takes this one step further, stating that Islam transcends geographical boundaries, and *dār al-islām* is where Muslims can freely practice Islam, regardless of living in a majority or minority³⁷.

The evolving concept of *dār al-da’wah* reflects a significant shift in Islamic jurisprudence, moving away from the traditional binary division of the world into *dār al-islām* and *dār al-ḥarb* and acknowledging Europe as a unique territory for the peaceful propagation of Islam. The emphasis on peaceful preaching and integration, as advocated by influential figures like Yusuf al-Qaradawi, aligns with the broader doctrine of *wasāṭiyyah*, promoting moderation and coexistence.

***Fiqh al-Aqalliyāt* (Minority Jurisprudence) and the Role of the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR)**

Acknowledging the unique challenges encountered by Muslims in Europe, Islamic jurists from the Muslim Brotherhood milieu advocated for the necessity of developing a new legal framework to regulate the lives of Muslims in non-Islamic societies. This led to the emergence of a new branch within Islamic jurisprudence known as *fiqh al-aqalliyāt*, “minority jurisprudence.” Its purpose is to give *fatwas*, regulating and coordinating the lives of Muslims in Europe.

Al-Qaradawi and Al-Alwani explain the necessity of *fiqh al-aqalliyāt* in response to the distinctive circumstances faced by Muslim communities in the West. Muslims residing in Europe are obliged to adhere to the

35. Al-Qaradawi, Yu. (1995) MAYA Conference, Toledo, Ohio [https://www.investigative-project.org/profile/167/yusuf-al-qaradawi, accessed on 20.02.2023]; *Leading Sunni Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradawi and Other Sheikhs Herald the Coming Conquest of Rome*. Middle East Media and Research Institute, MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 447 (December 6, 2002) [https://www.memri.org/reports/leading-sunni-sheikh-yousef-al-qaradawi-and-other-sheikhs-herald-coming-conquest-rome, accessed on 20.02.2023]; Vidino, L., Altuna, S., *The Muslim Brotherhood’s Pan-European Structure*, p. 34.

36. Al-Qaradāwī, yY. *Fī Fiqh al-Aqalliyāt al-Muslīma*, p. 32.

37. Al-Alwānī, *Madḫal ila Fiqh al-Aqalliyāt*, p. 15.

laws of their host countries, which may, in some cases, contradict the *Sharia*⁴¹. Therefore, there is a pressing need for new legal rulings. Given these considerations, they advocated for a specialized *fiqh* rooted in a solid legal foundation that would address the specifics of the contemporary era and existing conditions. Al-Qaradawi asserts that just as the Muslim communities in the West constitute an integral part of the global Muslim *ummah*, *fiqh al-aqalliyāt* is not situated outside the boundaries of *fiqh*; rather, it is one of its constituent parts, drawing from the same sources. As an example, he points out other similar divisions within the Islamic jurisprudence, such as *al-fiqh al-ṭibbī* (medical jurisprudence), *al-fiqh al-siyāsī* (political jurisprudence), and *al-fiqh al-iqtisādī* (economic jurisprudence)³⁸. Al-Alwani similarly states that *fiqh al-aqalliyāt* is “the same general *fiqh* (*fiqh al-jamā’ah*) under special conditions, allowing things that may be prohibited in other cases”³⁹. Al-Alwani attributes the emergence of *fiqh al-aqalliyāt* to various factors, the most significant of them being the unprecedented migration of Muslims outside *dār al-islām*, which had not happened since the time of Prophet Muhammad. In the past, if Muslims needed to change their place of residency due to certain circumstances, they would relocate within the vast Islamic empire without feeling alienated or isolated from the *ummah*⁴⁰.

The role of the European Council for Fatwa and Research⁴¹ (ECFR) is instrumental in addressing the unique challenges and legal questions faced by Muslims living in non-Muslim majority countries. Established in 1997 in Dublin, the ECFR stands as one of the most important organizations of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Pan-European network. It was founded by the Federation of Islamic Organization in Europe (FIOE), later renamed the Council of European Muslims (CEM)⁴², which is an umbrella organization of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Pan-European network⁴³. Founded by Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who

38. Al-Qaradāwī, Yu. *Fī Fiqh al-Aqalliyāt al-Muslima*, p. 32.

39. Al-‘Alwānī, *Madḫal ila Fiqh al-Aqalliyāt*, p. 3.

40. Ibid.

41. European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR) [<https://www.e-cfr.org/en/>, accessed on 03.04.2023].

42. Council of European Muslims (CEM) [<https://www.eumuslims.org/en/home/>, accessed on 06.04.2024].

43. The Council of European Muslims is the first and the most important organization founded by the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe. Founded in 1989 in Brussels, it has member organizations from more than 20 countries. CEM’s membership and governance are overwhelmingly dominated by top European Brotherhood activists. More on CEM see Vidino, L., Altuna, S. *The Muslim Brotherhood’s Pan-European Structure*, pp. 52–64.

served as its chairman from its founding until 2018, the majority of ECFR members are affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Taha Jabir al-Alwani also served as a member of ECFR. Vidino L. and Altuna S. argue that since its establishment, the ECFR has served to promote Qaradawi's ideas and establish itself as the exclusive authority for Muslims living in Europe by developing a new corpus of adapted jurisprudence⁴⁴.

ECFR serves as a jurisprudential body dedicated to addressing the various challenges encountered by Muslims in Europe. The primary objective of this institution is to issue *fatwas* that provide guidance on various issues faced by Muslims living in Europe. It issues numerous *fatwas* annually, addressing family law, economic matters, and social issues confronted by Muslims. It is important to mention that the rulings of ECFR are nonbinding and are adopted through social acceptance.

As it befits the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, the ECFR doesn't adhere to one specific *madhhab*, but rather draws on all four major schools of Sunni law. The members of the ECFR give special significance to *ijtihad* — independent reasoning by an expert in Islamic law, in order to give *fatwas* that are suited for “our time and place”⁴⁵. In the course of this, the ECFR scholars are also constantly revising and amending the issued *fatwas*. They explain it by the “new exigencies and consequences that we had not considered at the time, or owing to a newly manifesting benefit (*maslahah*) that has emerged”⁴⁶. By doing so, they also point out that if the *fatwas* issued during the past 20 years are subject to revision, “then on what basis are some people insisting on legal opinions that were given centuries ago without bothering to revisit and reconsider matters?”⁴⁷. At the same time, it is stated that this need arises not because the muftis of the past were unqualified or mistaken, but because the times have changed, bringing about the necessity of changes. Thus, they legitimize the need for revision and *ijtihad* and the need for a new legal framework designed specifically for Muslims living in Europe.

44. Ibid., p. 103.

45. *The European Council for Fatwa and Research: Renewed leadership, renewed hopes*. The European Council for Fatwa and Research [<https://www.e-cfr.org/blog/2018/12/16/european-council-fatwa-research/>], accessed on 03.04.2024].

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

Conclusions

The latter half of the 20th century witnessed a significant influx of Muslims to European countries. *Ikhwans* (Muslim Brotherhood members), whose arrival to Europe coincided with Muslim migration to the continent, were quick to recognize the need to adapt to the evolving conditions spurred by Muslim migration to Europe. They demonstrated flexibility on various issues concerning different aspects of Muslim life in non-Islamic societies. Prominent figures like Al-Qaradawi and Al-Alwani revised and amended certain aspects of Islamic jurisprudence concerning Muslims residing in non-Islamic societies, legally justifying the presence of Muslims in these societies and addressing its permissibility, by devising mechanisms for resolving emerging challenges unique to their conditions.

Ikhwans advocate not only for the permissibility of Muslims to live in non-Islamic societies of Europe but also for the necessity of Islam to establish its presence globally. The doctrine of *wasatīyyah* (moderation) serves as a cornerstone for the Brotherhood's strategies in Europe, advocating for a balanced approach that integrates Islamic principles with active participation in public life and encouraging Muslims to engage with their host societies without losing their Islamic identity. The redefinition of Europe as *dār al-da'wah* (abode of propagation) further underscores this approach. Unlike the traditional binary division of the world into *dār al-islām* (abode of Islam) and *dār al-ḥarb* (abode of war), this new categorization recognizes the unique circumstances in Europe, where Muslims can freely practice and propagate their faith. Both Al-Qaradawi and Al-Alwani emphasize the importance of Muslims living in Europe to actively engage and participate in shaping its social and political landscape, in line with the broader mission of Islam to have a global impact.

The development of *fiqh al-aqalliyyāt* (minority jurisprudence) further illustrates the Brotherhood's adaptive strategies. This specialized branch of Islamic jurisprudence addresses the unique challenges faced by Muslim minorities in non-Islamic societies, providing tailored legal rulings that harmonize Islamic principles with the legal and social realities of Europe. The European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR), established by Yusuf al-Qaradawi, has been instrumental in formulating these new rulings, striving to provide guidance and solutions to the realities faced by Muslims in Europe.

Concluding, the Muslim Brotherhood's adaptive strategies in Europe highlight their pragmatic approach to integrating Islamic prin-

ciples within a non-Islamic context. By promoting the doctrine of *wasatiyyah* and redefining Europe as *dār al-da'wah*, the Brotherhood advocates for active engagement and participation of Muslims in European societies. The development of *fiqh al-aqalliyyāt* and the efforts of the ECFR underscore the Brotherhood's commitment to addressing the unique challenges faced by Muslim minorities, ensuring that Islamic teachings remain relevant and applicable in the modern European context.

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