Idle Freedom and the Problem of Hell

Abstract

This paper examines the problem of practical and social significance of the belief in free will on the example of Derk Pereboom's theory of hard incompatibilism. First, I present the general elements of hard in-compatibilism focusing on its positive aspects that involve a forward-looking approach to moral responsibility and a proposal to replace a number of allegedly destructive reactive attitudes with less damaging and more constructive ones. Second, I elaborate and discuss the general logic of moral justification that, as I argue, underlies Pereboom's approach. Ifurther argue that this logic entails the irrelevance of the belief in free will for moral justification of social practices. Third, I outline the main features of the problem of hell in order to show that hell could not be morally justified in Pereboom's logic of moral justification. Then I show that the idea of hell provides a unique example where the belief in libertarian free will plays a crucial role in the structure of moral justification. On this basis, I argue that while the belief in free will is mostly irrelevant for the justification of social practices, it might play a crucial role in the justifications of religious practices that involve the belief in hell.